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~~DDA Memo, 4 Apr 72~~

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Auth: DDA R. 17/1763

Date: 31 MAR 1978 By: 628

**COUNTRY** Greece

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DATE: 25X1X6

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## SUPPLEMENT

**SUBJECT** Attempts to Form a  
Government

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## ORIGIN

25X1X6

This document is hereby regraded to  
CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the  
letter of 16 October 1978 from the  
Director of Central Intelligence to the  
Archivist of the United States.

Next Review Date: 2/28/2008

**SOURCE**

1. Well-informed circles believe that there is a strong possibility that Tsaldaris will resign, notwithstanding his prior adamant position which has been supported by the British.
2. Venizelos and Sophoulis have achieved a working agreement regarding their participation in a coalition government excluding the EAM and KKE. Kanellopoulos, chief of the National Unionist Party, and Papandreou, chief of the Democratic Socialist Party, have agreed to the basis of participation.
3. Discussions are being held with Populist Party leaders regarding the basis of a coalition. An attempted compromise by the Populist Party involving the relinquishment of the Premiership and the Ministry of Public Security with retention of the Ministries of War and Navy was rejected by Venizelos and Sophoulis.
4. There is a strong possibility of a compromise based on Tsaldaris resigning with the Populist Party retaining the Premiership, which would be held by a more moderate right-wing personality approved by the Opposition. The Populist Party would also keep the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Navy but would relinquish the Ministries of War, Public Security, and Economy.
5. In a meeting on 4 January with Venizelos, General Crawford, chief of British Land Forces in Greece, sought his influence for acceptance of the compromise referred to in paragraph 3 above.
6. Continued, unpublicized, sporadic but well-organized hostilities in the Southern Peloponnese together with a marked increase in retaliatory killings in Athens and its suburbs is an important factor in seriously weakening the Government's position and is apparently compelling the British to modify their prior complete support of Tsaldaris.

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COMMENT: It does not seem likely that any change is possible until after Parliament reconvenes on 16 January. The compromise mentioned in paragraph 4 above is anomalous, but it may avoid a vote of confidence against the Government by the party in control of Parliament.

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